Jacob's Purchase of the Birthright

    Can any man approve of the conduct of Jacob? It was base, it was ungenerous, it was hypocritical, it was unjust. Yet the God of Providence gives it success, while he does not sanction it. He does more than this. He makes conduct, of which he disapproves, the very means of effecting his eternal purpose. And was he at a loss for means to accomplish his purpose, that he chose to fulfil his will by an act of the foulest treachery? No, he has his choice of means to effect the events which he designs to bring about. And this means was the best suited to answer the ends of his sovereign wisdom. It was in every part suited to his design. Had any part of it been otherwise, it would never have existed.

    The sovereignty of Providence meets us here at the very threshhold. Could any thing have been easier for Providence to effect, than to cause that Jacob should have been the first-born of the twins? This would have taken away all occasion for the existence of this disgraceful conduct in Jacob. But instead of making Jacob the first-born, Providence undoubtedly constitutes Esau the first-born for a specific purpose. God designedly gives occasion to the scheme of Jacob and his mother. In the very birth of the children, Divine Providence points out the future history by Jacob taking hold of Esau's heel.

    The different dispositions, habits, and manner of life of the two brothers, were calculated to cooperate in bringing about the event here related. "Esau was a cunning hunter, a man of the field; and Jacob was a plain man, dwelling in tents." This circumstance was the occasion of exposing Esau to the hunger, through the temptation of which he was induced to sell his birthright, while it afforded to Jacob an opportunity of supplying his brother's want at the moment.

    The sinful partiality of the parents, each for a different child, had also a distinguished share in bringing about the event. The ground of Isaac's peculiar love to Esau was utterly unwarrantable; and it is not said that Rebekah's preference of Jacob was grounded on his character. At all events, she loved Jacob peculiarly, and by this means the birthright was transferred from Esau to his younger brother. Had Esau been the favourite of his mother, or of both his parents, this scheme would not have been contrived to deprive him of his birthright. Every link in the chain is inserted by the hand of Providence.

    The answer of God to Rebekah, declaring that "the elder shall serve the younger," no doubt makes Isaac guilty of rashness at least, in conferring the birthright, without farther consulting the Lord. He acted evidently out of preference to Esau. But this is another feature of the Sovereignty of Providence in this matter. God could easily have made Jacob the favourite of his father as well as of his mother. Had he done so, no occasion could have been given to this crime in Jacob. His father would have given him the blessing by consulting the mind of the Lord. This providential circumstance shows us also that God can effect his purposes through the means of persons who intend to thwart them, as well as by those who intend to give them effect. He made Isaac transfer the birthright to Jacob, in the very act by which he intended to give it to Esau; and thus to derange the appointment of God. It may alleviate the guilt of Rebekah in this matter, that she knew the divine appointment. But it is not said that she acted on this principle. She

    loved Jacob, and therefore contrived to give him the birthright. There is no intimation that, from honouring the divine intentions, she endeavoured to fulfil them. Even had this been true, it would not justify her. She should have left to the Lord the means of effecting his own sovereign purposes. David knew that he was to be king in the place of Saul, yet David would not on that account destroy or injure the Lord's anointed even when he was in his power, and when his own life was in the greatest danger from the king of Israel.

    Many persons think that the account of this transaction is irrational and incredible. How could Esau be at the point of death by hunger in his father's residence? But this objection is grounded on a supposition that is not true. It is not in evidence, and therefore need not be believed, that the two brothers were now in their father's usual place of abode. On the contrary, there is sufficient evidence that this was not the case. Jacob, we are told, was a plain man, dwelling in tents. This implies that he had his residence at different places, as his business of a shepherd required. Like the sons of Jacob, who were living at a distance from their father, when he sent Joseph to visit them, Jacob himself, in the same occupation, was obliged to live at" a distance from his father. Esau, wherever he usually resided, was out in the chase, and, on his return, called at the tent of his brother Jacob. This circumstance occasioned the temptation by which Esau lost his birthright, and Jacob forfeited his integrity ; but by which God fulfilled his sovereign will.

    Were this a mere possibility, it is sufficient to answer the objection, but that it is a fact is in evidence from the passage itself. When Esau had finished eating and drinking, he " rose up and went his way." Does not this imply, that his usual place of residence was elsewhere? Rashness and incredulity often start objections, which, instead of manifesting uncommon perspicacity, owe their origin to ignorance and want of attention.